thus be estimated more precisely.
The main …ndings of the empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, within each group individual earnings increase with age and decrease with the number of years the individual has been living in the current place. The time spent in the group, as a proxy for experience, has a positive but insigni…cant impact on earnings, suggesting that the notion of 'seniority' rewarded by these groups is strictly related to age. Second, women and young people are relatively more dependent on group activities for their living, while adult males often have an alternative source of income. 'Dependency' is also negatively correlated to the income that the individual was earning before joining the group, suggesting that group production serves a particularly crucial function for members with low 'outside options'. Third, among the most valuable functions of these groups is that of giving access to loans to otherwise credit constrained individuals. About 64 percent of the respondents had borrowed from the group as a whole or from individual members in the twelve months before the survey. The single most important factor to gain access to such loans seems to be speaking the same language of the chairperson. Ceteris paribus, members of the same ethnic group as the chairperson are 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to borrow from the group or from other members. Fourth, while ethnic fragmentation and wealth inequality do not a¤ect the likelihood of borrowing, inequality in group earnings has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect. The e¤ect is particularly strong in groups that experienced …nancial losses, suggesting that when the available capital to lend is particularly scarce and members are not remunerated 'uniformly' it may be di¢cult to reach consensus on who should get a loan. This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that when loans from the group as a whole are distinguished from loans from individual members, earnings inequality negatively a¤ects the former but not the latter. Finally, apart from a¤ecting the allocation of loans, heterogeneity seems to in ‡uence the organization of production. In more ethnically heterogeneous groups it is less common for members to specialize in di¤erent task and more likely that everyone does the same job. Also, ethnic fragmentation seems to be associated with remuneration schemes in which every worker gets the same …xed amount, rather than being paid on the basis of the number of hours worked or the number of items produced. Again, this may be due to the relative di¢culty of reaching consensus in heterogenous groups. The ability to sanction free riding behavior on contributions to the group is also negatively related to ethnic fragmentation, while that of sanctioning absenteeism and other irregular behavior is not. Finally, no pattern emerges between group composition and the criteria for recruiting new members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the setting, starting with a description of the informal sector and of self-help groups in Kenya and then moving to the speci…c data used in this paper. Section 4 contains econometric results on income generation, access to credit, and the organization of production. Section 5 concludes.
Background literature
The issue of heterogeneity and group participation has received increasing attention in recent years. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) analyze the impact of racial, ethnic, and income heterogeneity on individual propensity to join socio-political associations in the US and …nd that it has a negative e¤ect. La Ferrara (2001) models the role of wealth inequality in villages where people have the choice of joining groups that provide di¤erent net bene…ts to the rich and the poor, and shows that when access is unrestricted, higher village inequality translates into lower participation because the relatively rich opt out of the groups. Both papers di¤er from the present work in two respects.
First of all, they address the question of how groups form (what determines the likelihood that an individual will join), and not how they function. Secondly, they relate group formation to "society wide" heterogeneity as opposed to within-group heterogeneity. In fact, the link tested by those papers is from inequality (or racial fragmentation) in the "pool" from which members are drawn, to individual choices regarding group participation.
A strand of the literature which is closer to the current paper is the one on heterogeneity and group performance. This has been explored in the context of project maintenance by Khwaja (2000) , who uses project level data on 132 community-maintained infrastructure projects in the Himalayas.
The author …nds that, ceteris paribus, socially heterogeneous communities have poorly maintained projects, and that the relationship between maintenance and inequality in projects returns is Ushaped. Miguel (2000) and Gugerty and Miguel (2001) analyze the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on school funding and school organization in Kenyan villages. Both studies …nd that ethnic fragmentation is associated with worse outcomes, and suggest mechanisms though which this e¤ect may be generated.
In particular, Gugerty and Miguel …nd that the more racially heterogeneous the pupils' population, the lower are parental participation in school activities, school committee attendance, and teacher attendance and motivation. The authors suggest that these results may be due to the fact that social sanctions apply within ethnic groups, hence fragmented communities have lower scope for sanctioning noncooperative behavior. In a recent study, Karlan (2001) examines the impact of members' composition on savings and repayment performance in group lending programs o¤ered by a Peruvian organization. The author focuses on geographic and 'cultural' dispersion (Western versus indigenous) and …nds that both types of heterogeneity increase the probability of defaulting on group loans. As for savings, which can be viewed as a form of 'collective' good to the extent that capital is lent back to the members, geographic distance among the members signi…cantly reduces saving rates, while cultural dissimilarity has a negligible e¤ect. Finally, Wydick (1999) estimates the determinants of repayment performance and of intra-group insurance in a sample of 137 borrowing groups from Guatemala, and …nds that 'social ties' (as measured by the number of years members have known each other and by the degree of friendship and social interaction before and after joining the group) have a negligible impact on group performance. What seems to matter most is the availability of sanctioning mechanisms and the possibility of monitoring (as proxied by geographical distance and knowledge of each other's business).
The present study builds upon the above literature with a few signi…cant modi…cations. First, it considers groups that provide the main source of income for most of the members. In other words, individuals' stake in these groups is particularly high in this case as compared to project maintenance groups or school committees, and possibly even to borrowing groups, in that members mostly depend on production activities organized within these groups for their daily living. As such, it is important to investigate what determines individual earnings and the 'dependency rate' on group income, as well as group performance. And even when the attention is on the latter, we may expect the e¤ects of characteristics such as heterogeneity to be ampli…ed -and possibly di¤erent-in this context. Secondly, as will be described in the next section, the setting in which these groups operate is as precarious and socially disrupted as one may conceive, due to the virtual absence of property rights in the squatter communities and to the high degree of in and out-migration. This can also be expected to have an impact on group functioning. Finally, compared to some of the above studies in which the degree of heterogeneity and other group characteristics were estimated based on the leaders' evaluation, a key ingredient of the survey methodology in this study was to interview all members of each group and to compare their 'subjective' assessments with 'objective' measures of group composition. This reveals some interesting di¤erences, for example, in the case of wealth and income inequality.
Before turning to the description of the setting in which the data was collected, it is useful to compare this study to the earlier work by Abraham, Baland and Platteau (1998) . The authors surveyed 510 households from one of the most populated informal settlements of Nairobi, Kibera, collecting data on participation in di¤erent types of groups and on the socio-economic background of the respondents. The groups are then divided into several categories, such as rotating savings and credit associations, burial societies, health groups, etc. and their main characteristics in terms of organizational structure, contributions, and composition are examined. While similar for the context, the present paper di¤ers from the work of Abraham et al. in three respects. First, their approach is purely descriptive, while this paper employs multivariate analysis. Second, among their respondents some are members of a group and some are not, so they could estimate participation rates but not know who else is in the same group of a respondent. In this paper no participation regression can be run, because every respondent is by de…nition member of some group, but the identity and characteristics of all other group members are known. Finally, the data of Abraham et al. has a broader coverage, including groups with and without investment or production activities, while in this paper the focus is on groups with income generating activities.
3 The setting
Informal settlements and self-help groups in Nairobi
It is estimated that in 1993 more than 55 percent of the population of Nairobi lived in 'informal settlements', i.e. squatter communities where inhabitants have no legal right or at most a quasilegal right, in the form of temporary occupation right from the Local Authority or a letter from the Chief. 3 These informal settlements in turn cover less than 6 percent of Nairobi's residential area, which leads to an average density of 250 dwellings and 750 persons per hectare as compared to about 10 to 30 dwellings and 50 to 180 persons per hectare in upper and middle income areas (Alder et al. (1993) ). Until the late 1970s the government policy was to demolish informal settlements throughout the country, while since the early 1980s they gradually became tacitly accepted, with occasional episodes of demolition and resettlement of the population to other areas (for example, in Nairobi Muoroto and Kibagare in 1990, Mitumba in 1993). Uncertainty over basic property rights adds to that over land tenure to generate a pattern of extreme insecurity where almost no investment is made in infrastructure and local public goods. Dwellings are entirely made of temporary materials such as mud, wattle and timber o¤cuts, and waste disposal is done on the street and in the rivers.
Most sites have virtually no sewerage systems and hygienic conditions are extremely poor.
The inhabitants of squatter communities usually work in the informal sector. Most of them are involved in hawking, are occasionally employed for the day, or operate small businesses without licenses. A non-negligible fraction is also involved in illegal activities. Particular relevance have small businesses known as "jua kali", which encompass manufacturing activities, repair and services, and employ a large number of mechanics, carpenters and construction workers that serve other areas of Nairobi as well. 4 The attitude of the City Council has historically been that of discouraging this type of employment, but in recent years the o¢cial stand on this issue has shifted, possibly in recognition that the lack of employment opportunities in the formal sector for many slum dwellers called for 3 Technically, when some form of legal rights exists these may not be viewed as "squatter communities", but in this paper that terms will be used interchangeably with "informal settlements" and "slum". 4 The term "jua kali" was originally created to indicate people who work "under the sun" with no permanent structure, but has extended to represent the whole informal small business sector.
alternative forms of employment. Public opinion and policy makers have thus started to view the jua kali sector as a valuable opportunity for unemployed youth to enter the (informal) labor market and contribute to domestic product generation (Otieno Okumu (1999)).
Jua kali workers may have formal education, but they often receive informal training on the job, for which they may have to pay their employer (Ng'ethe and Ndua (1985)). In addition to training costs, people who want to start their own business need start up capital which, though limited compared to licensed businesses, may be far beyond the possibilities of a typical slum dweller. For this reason it is becoming increasingly common among the urban poor to join resources and form the so called "self-help" groups, which operate in the informal sector with income generating activities similar to those of individual jua kali workers, but are organized approximately as a production cooperative. The degree of formalization of these groups, as well as their stability and the scope of their activities, vary a lot. It seems therefore valuable to undertake a …rst step towards a quantitative assessment of the economic potential of these groups and of the determinants of their economic performance.
The data
The data used in the empirical analysis below was collected by the author in the months of July and August 1999 in …ve among the most populated informal settlements of Nairobi: Dandora, Gikomba, Kayole, Korogocho, and Mathare Valley. In consultation with local community workers, a list of the self-help groups active in these areas was prepared and twenty groups were selected to be interviewed, based on their location, type of activity, size, age and sex of the members. 5 A key requirement was that the group had some type of income generating activity (though not necessarily the only activity of the group). Income generating activities in the sample span as di¤erent …elds as crafts-making (wood carving, basket weaving, etc.), tailoring, garbage recycling, education and health services, informal lending, etc. Preliminary meetings were set up with the chairperson and secretary of each group, and a list of all active members was obtained. Based on this list, individual interviews were scheduled with each member for the survey modules on demographics, income, and personal assessment of group functioning. An additional module was administered separately to the chairperson, the treasurer, and the secretary of each group to gather information on the history, organizational structure, and costs and revenues of the group. Given that the methodology of this study required a complete survey of all participants in the group, only groups for which at least 90 percent of the members were successfully interviewed were retained in the sample. This leaves us with 18 groups for a total of 303 individual members.
[Insert table 1] As can be seen from table 1, the groups in the sample di¤er substantially in terms of size and of the number of years they have been in place. The smallest group has 6 members and the largest has 30, with an average of 14 members per group. The average group has been in place for almost 5 years, with a minimum of 9 months and a maximum of 16 years. Groups are mostly mixed in terms of gender, with 33 percent of them being all-women and 11 percent being all men. These …gures are not surprising, given the prominent role of women groups in the informal sector of most developing countries. The average group member is 31 years old, but this …gure hides substantial di¤erences in the sample: the 'youngest' group has a mean age of its members equal to 19, and the 'oldest' group of 60. Approximately 10 percent of the respondents has no formal schooling, 48.4 percent has Class 1-8, and the rest has higher education. This is an important piece of evidence because it shows that in the reality of urban informal settlements with strong barriers to entry in the formal labor market, self-help groups cater not only to unskilled workers. Finally, members' wealth was assessed on the basis of ownership of a basket of durable consumption goods such as radio, TV, camera, bike, car, stove, electric or gas cooker, stove, clock, sofa, bed and mattress, weighted by an estimate of their prices in the informal market. 6 Based on this index, the average respondent owned durables for 7,379
Kenyan Shillings (Ksh), which amounted to 99.6 US dollars in August 1999 prices. Groups di¤ered substantially in wealth, though, with the average member of the 'poorest' group having 2,450 Ksh, and that of the richest having ten times as much.
In what follows we turn to multivariate analysis to investigate how individual and aggregate characteristics a¤ect the economic performance of these groups.
4 Empirical results
Income generation
The …rst aspect to be considered is the potential for income generation provided by these groups.
One can estimate the following earnings function:
where y ij is the log of hourly earnings of individual i in group j, X ij is a vector of individual characteristics, D j if a set of group dummies, and " ij is an error term. Individual characteristics, which should capture labor productivity, include sex, marital status, age, education, and experience (proxied by the number of years the respondent has been in the group), as well as language dummies.
A non-linear speci…cation is chosen for age, education and experience, to allow for nonlinearities in the returns to human capital. Group …xed e¤ects are introduced to control for di¤erences in remuneration schemes across activities.
[Insert consider that the areas of study are probably the poorest and most degraded of urban Nairobi, so having resided somewhere else probably means higher 'unobserved ability'.
In column 3 a set of language dummies is introduced to control for whether the respondent is Kikuyu, Luo, or Kamba (the omitted category is Luhya and other ethnicities). Furthermore, the dummy 'Dominant language' takes value 1 if the individual speaks the same language as the majority of other group members, and zero otherwise. This is aimed at capturing possible ethnic favoritism, as found for example by Collier and Garg (1999) in the Ghanaian labor market. As can be seen from the table, the coe¢cient on this variable is not statistically di¤erent from zero. A possible explanation is that when the decision process is not democratic, what counts is not belonging to the majority, but being the same ethnicity as the leaders. The last column introduces a dummy for whether the respondent speaks the same language as the chairperson of the group when decisions are reported to be made by leaders as opposed to democratically, but the conclusion remains the same.
The coe¢cient on this variable is positive but not statistically signi…cant. 7 A second aspect to consider in order to assess the role of these groups for income generation is to what extent they o¤er better earning opportunities compared to individual jobs in the informal sector.
When asked what was the most important reason for joining the group, 39% of the respondents said that they did not have another job, 25% said that they had a job but the job the group was better, 19% indicated the access to side bene…ts such as health or training opportunities, and the rest gave other reasons. At …rst sight, then, the answer to the above question is not obvious. A possible way to rephrase the question is to ask to what extent people are dependent on these groups as their main source of income, and estimate the determinants of this 'dependency ratio' through multivariate 7 The variable 'Chair's language' is an interaction between a dummy equal to 1 if the language of the respondent is the same as that of the chariperson, and a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares that 'leaders decide' in the group. Using only the former dummy also yielded an insigni…cant result.
analysis.
[Insert people who were earning more in the past are less dependent on the group to earn a living. Notice also that from column 4 dependency decreases with education up to Form 4 level, as one should expect. 8 
Access to credit
Aside from the cash ‡ow provided by the group in the form of earnings, responses to the survey suggest that many members value the possibility of resorting to the group for help in case of need. Table 4 estimates the probability of borrowing from the group or from individual members as a function of the respondents' characteristics plus group …xed e¤ects. The regressors are meant to control both for demand and for supply factors, as will be clear from the discussion. Column 1 reports marginal probit coe¢cients on demographic variables only. It is surprising that only the language dummies are statistically signi…cant. The single most signi…cant regressor is a dummy identifying respondents that speak the same language as the chairperson when decisions are taken by the leaders. Ceteris paribus, speaking the language of the chairperson increases the probability of borrowing from the group or from members by 20 percentage points, which is a very sizeable e¤ect.
Column 2 adds two measures of individual wealth, to control for the need to borrow. The …rst is a dummy equal to one if the respondent or a relative owns a house, which for the reasons explained in variable remains signi…cant in all cases and its coe¢cient is even bigger in the 2SLS regression.
[Insert table 5]
Apart from including group …xed e¤ects, the analysis so far has not attempted to relate ability to borrow to any speci…c group characteristic. The remaining variables are indexes of heterogeneity within the group.
Fragmentation indexes measure the likelihood that two randomly drawn member belong to different 'categories' and are computed as follows:
where j represents a group, k a category, and each term s kj is the share of category k in the total membership of group j. Technical or College), and residential location. 9 All indexes are constructed in a way that increasing values correspond to more heterogeneity.
From the studies reviewed in section 2, both ethnic and geographic fragmentation can be expected to play a signi…cant role to the extent that they capture possibilities for information ‡ows, monitoring and enforcement. Education fragmentation instead is usually not employed in the literature, but becomes relevant in the present study because di¤erent education levels may represent complementary production skills. As can be seen from the table, of the fragmentation indexes only that related to education is signi…cant: members of groups in which widespread education levels are represented are more likely to borrow, possibly because of complementarities among members themselves.
The last two regressors in column 1 are Gini coe¢cients of inequality either in wealth (durable assets ownership) or in earnings from the group. It is noticeable that the latter has a negative and highly signi…cant coe¢cient, indicating that when members earn very di¤erent amounts from group activities it is less likely that loans are advanced either by the group as a whole or by individual members. Column 2 expands on this result by allowing the coe¢cient on group income inequality to di¤er depending on whether the group has positive or negative pro…ts. Interestingly, the negative e¤ect of inequality on credit is found in groups that have …nancial di¢culties but not in those that make positive pro…ts. In other words, having members who earn very di¤erent amounts does not harm their ability to borrow if the pie is large enough for a number of them, while it does undermine lending by the group or among individuals when members have to struggle over resources.
[Insert table 6]
Borrowing from the group as a whole or borrowing from individual members could make a di¤erence, especially in the light of the above result. willingness and ability to lend to each other, but it does undermine the ability to use the group as a source of credit, especially when the group runs in …nancial di¢culties (see column 2). This may be due to the di¢culty of agreeing on how to allocate the common funds when these are very limited.
The next section will look more closely at the various forms of heterogeneity among group members and at the relationship between heterogeneity and group organization.
Heterogeneity and group organization
One of the clear patterns that emerged from the previous analysis was that certain types of heterogeneity had a stronger impact than others. In particular, inequality in individual earnings from the group signi…cantly reduced the ability to borrow from the group as a whole, while inequality in "wealth", as measured by the index of durable goods, did not. It is useful to investigate why this is the case.
In addition to asking about 'objective' wealth, the questionnaire asked each respondent the following question: "Leaving aside the income from this group, do the members have the same wealth?"; and prompted the following responses: "Mostly the same", "Some di¤erences", "Very di¤erent". Figure 1 relates this 'subjective' notion of inequality to the objective ones used in the regressions.
[ belongings, but that they have fairly accurate information about how much each member is paid, which matches the environmental conditions of the informal settlements and the groups surveyed pretty closely. If subjective beliefs are formed this way, then, it is not surprising that inequality in earnings a¤ects group functioning more than wealth inequality: members' ability to agree on collective outcomes may depend more on their beliefs than on their objective conditions.
The bottom panel in …gure 1 plots the fraction of people who think that members di¤er a lot in wealth against the likelihood that two randomly drawn members of the group belong to di¤erent ethnicities. The link between ethnicity and wealth is not obvious in this context, but it may be that simply by considering a member as an "outsider" leads an individual to label him or her as very di¤erent in terms of wealth. The …gure suggests a weak positive association between the two dimensions (the correlation coe¢cient is .10). Finally, in no case the heterogeneity indexes considered vary systematically with size, which means that higher heterogeneity does not simply capture a larger group of participants (which may be considered a source of collective action problems).
[Insert table 7]
In the light of the above discussion it is useful to examine the impact of various dimensions of heterogeneity on the organization of production within the group. Table 7 reports summary statistics on the percentage of groups that fall into di¤erent forms of organization. These statistics are computed both for the entire sample and splitting the groups into 'High' and 'Low' heterogeneity depending on whether their degree of heterogeneity is above the median or not (where the median is the index of heterogeneity of the median group). The dimensions of heterogeneity considered are ethnic, in wealth, and in education. Inequality in earnings from the group is omitted because it is endogenous to the organization of production chosen.
Starting from the division of labor, on average 33% of the groups assign the same task to everybody, 45% allow for specialization, and 22% have di¤erent tanks in which the members alternate, so that no one is systematically assigned to a given task. When we split the sample according to their ethnic fragmentation (columns 2 and 3) the pattern is di¤erent. Highly fragmented groups tend to be ones in which everyone does the same job, while in relatively homogeneous groups it is more common to observe specialization in tasks. A possible explanation, which will be further advanced below, is that when members are heterogeneous it is more di¢cult to reach consensus on something that would generate disparities in economic treatment or in responsibilities, hence a " ‡at" rule becomes more attractive. Notice that this does not hold for heterogeneity in wealth, which, as argued above, is likely not to be common knowledge among the members. As for education levels (columns 6-7), more heterogeneous groups display more specialization, while in homogeneous ones everyone tends to do the same thing. This seems reasonable, given that people with di¤erent education are 'naturally' suited to di¤erent tasks.
Turning to remuneration schemes, groups tend to fall into two broad categories: those that pay a …xed amount equal for everyone (55.6%) and those that pay in proportion to the number of items produced (33.2%). Occasionally, they pay according to the number of hours worked (5.6%) or to the contributions made by the members when the group started (5.6%). When the sample is split according to ethnic fragmentation, more heterogeneous groups tend to pay a ' ‡at rate', while more homogeneous ones pay in proportion to output. As above, this can be interpreted as resulting from problems in reaching agreements that involve di¤erential treatment of heterogeneous members.
Results for wealth inequality go along the same lines, while those for education heterogeneity again follow the expected allocation of 'competence'.
Previous studies (e.g., Gugerty and Miguel (2001) ) indicate the sanctioning technology as the key mechanisms through which ethnic fragmentation a¤ects group functioning. The third panel of table 7 reports data on the fraction of groups that employ a penalty (monetary …ne or suspension)
in case of missed contributions and in the case of absenteeism and other irregular behavior. To control for 'nominal' versus 'e¤ective' penalties, the average number of times in which the given punishment was applied in the past year is also reported. In the full sample, the percentage of groups imposing a penalty for missed contributions is 38%, and that for irregular behavior is 47%.
When these statistics are computed separately for 'high' and 'low' heterogeneity groups, we …nd a signi…cant pattern of di¤erentiation with respect to ethnic fragmentation. Only 14% of the ethnically heterogeneous groups penalize missed contributions, while 67% of the homogeneous ones do. Wealth inequality works in the same direction, though the discrepancy is somewhat smaller. As for education heterogeneity, the pattern is reversed but we have already seen that this index seems to capture skill complementarities more than 'con ‡ict'. From the number of times in which the penalty is applied, it seems that when ethnically fragmented groups do envisage a penalty, they apply it more often than others (though this may be due to higher need for punishment due to increased tension, as opposed to greater e¤ectiveness). Sanctions for absenteeism and irregular behavior seem more or less equally likely and uniformly applied between high and low heterogeneity groups, suggesting that the e¤ect of fragmentation may be closely related to control over economic resources.
Finally, the last panel of table 7 explores whether there is a relationship between the criteria for recruitment and the composition of the group. For example, if new members are chosen on the basis of their ability we may expect groups to be more heterogenous than if they are chosen because they are 'friends' of other members. In the aggregate, group leaders say that the single most important criterion to select new members is 'commitment' (50% of the groups), indicating the degree of uncertainty faced in their everyday work. The remaining criteria are ability (22%), need of the member (22%), and only in rare cases friendship (5.6%). Interestingly, no clear relationship emerges between the recruitment criterion and the heterogeneity of the group, which may be due to the limited importance of the 'friendship' factor in determining who joins. When individual members were interviewed about the main reason for joining the group, only 6% said that they had friends in the group. All this is comforting because it is consistent with the interpretation that the causal link goes from heterogeneity to decision making and group performance, and not the opposite. In fact, if group composition were the result of a 'biased' decision making processes, we should expect the method of recruitment to be correlated with the degree of heterogeneity, which from table 7 is not.
Conclusions
Overall, the empirical evidence in this paper suggests that self-help groups are an important source of income for certain categories of people (e.g., women and young members), and that they can serve an insurance function by giving access to group loans or loans from members. Group composition a¤ects both the extent to which borrowing can be carried out within the group, and the organization of production in terms of division of labor, compensation schemes, and sanctioning technology. The data do not give insights into how groups get to be more or less heterogeneous, but they seem to suggest that fragmented groups may be limited in their choices by the need to curb the higher potential for con ‡ict within the group. To the extent that the resulting choices (lower access to group loans, simpler production and compensation schemes, lower ability to sanction) are suboptimal from an e¢ciency point of view, the case for understanding the roots of social cohesion and 'social capital' within these groups is strengthened. 
A.1 Summary statistics

